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Families Belong Together: The Path to Family
Sanctity in Public Housing
McKayla Stokes*
ABSTRACT
In its 2015 landmark civil rights decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court
finally held that the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States
Constitution guarantee same-sex couples’ marital equality. The Court’s unprecedented
declaration that the right to marry is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause
strengthened married couples’ right to privacy because it subjects government actions
infringing on marital unions to heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has the option to
minimize the impact of Obergefell by interpreting the right to marriage very narrowly—as
only encompassing the right to enter into a state-recognized union with another person.
However, drawling from Justice Douglas’ “penumbras principle” from Griswold v.
Connecticut, this Note argues that interpreting the right to marriage to include its
peripheral rights, like cohabitating, is the more principled approach. Using this approach,
public housing authorities as government entities must prove that policies that disqualify
ex-felons and arrestees from residing on their premises—even when their spouses are
current residents—are necessary to further a compelling interest and narrowly tailored to
be constitutional. Recognizing that a penumbra approach to interpreting the right to
marriage would nonetheless leave non-marital families subject to broad governmental
interference, this Note concludes by reasoning that non-marital families would have a
strong argument that the differential treatment violates the Equal Protection Clause.
INTRODUCTION
“I have three children. I take care of a disabled uncle. I haven’t had any infractions
since I was incarcerated. I’ve worked at one place for nine years,” explains Dana Monroe
of Charlottesville whose nearly ten-year hunt for consistent housing has proved
unsuccessful due to a single felony conviction.1 Ms. Monroe’s struggle to find housing is
familiar among low-income ex-felons and arrestees. The sting of rejection that
accompanies each rental denial ex-felons receive push some to give up applying
altogether and submit to what seems inevitable—homelessness.2
*J.D. Candidate Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2020; I am grateful to Erin F. Delaney and Destiny
Peery whose critical feedback strengthened this Note immensely. I would like to thank the entire staff of
Northwestern’s Journal of Law and Social Policy for their patience and suggestions during the editing
process.
1
Emily Hays, Barred from Affordable Housing, CHARLOTTESVILLE TOMORROW (May 13, 2018, 7:00 PM),
https://www.cvilletomorrow.org/articles/barred-from-affordable-housing.
2
See Amy Qin, Public Housing Appeals Give Hope to Homeless with Criminal Records, PITT. POSTGAZETTE (Sep. 10, 2018, 6:15 AM), https://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2018/09/10/public-affordablehousing-criminal-homeless-Pittsburgh-housing-authority/stories/201808190012.
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During the 1980s, Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) began excluding applicants
who had been arrested for, or criminally convicted of, a broad spectrum of crimes.3 The
impact of public housing “bans” is diffuse because if one member of a family is
ineligible, the remaining members eligible for residency must decide which is more
tolerable: enduring indefinite periods of separation or committing to unaffordable private
living arrangements. This dilemma is particularly alarming for families with young
children or those with family members who suffer from a disability.4 While non-profit
supportive housing entities provide relief to some,5 the critical question is not what can
these entities do to help, but rather, why is their help needed in the first place?
How is it permissible for government agencies to perpetuate homelessness and
family separation on the grounds of a single member’s previous criminal history? One
answer lies within the United States’ failure to strictly enforce constitutional rights and
liberty interests to family sanctity and privacy. The text of the Constitution does not
explicitly provide families with greater privacy rights, but several controversial Supreme
Court decisions pieced together demonstrate that the Court recognizes the particular need
for privacy in familial decisions.6 As a result, the Court has relied on the Due Process
Clause to restrain government action that touches upon family matters. The disconnect,
however, between the Constitution’s text and society’s special appreciation for families
has resulted in extremely malleable “familial rights.” The unpredictable nature of the
jurisprudence is partly due to the fact that substantive due process cases are inherently
fact-specific and viewed with great skepticism by strict textualists and originalists.7
3

See generally Lahny R. Silva, Criminal Histories in Public Housing, WIS. L. REV. 375 (2015).
See Stories of Annapolis Residents Challenging Housing Policy that Tears Families Apart, AM. C.L.
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/stories-annapolis-residents-challenging-housing-policy-tears-familiesapart (last visited Oct. 24, 2019).
5
See Qin, supra note 2.
6
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding for the first time that the due process clause
“denotes not merely the freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to. . . marry,
establish a home and bring up children. . .”); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus &
Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down the Compulsory Education Act of 1922 that forced
parents to send their children to a public school in their residential district because “[u]nder the doctrine of
Meyer v. Nebraska. . .the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (citing both Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus & Mary as evidence that the “custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder”
and “that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (“reaffirm[ing] the principles of the Pierce and Meyer
cases” in its decision that while the “association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution. . . various
guarantees [in the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy,” including the marriage relationship, that the state
cannot unnecessarily invade); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 499-504 (1977)
(striking down a zoning ordinance that “narrowly defined family patterns” in a manner that prevented a
grandmother from residing with her grandson on the grounds that the Court’s decisions “establish that the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family” which includes extended family households).
7
Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 63, 79 (2006) (“[T]here is
no persuasive evidence that these liberties were embraced by the original, objective public meaning of the
clause. It seems plain that substantive due process grants constitutional protection to rights that are neither
enumerated in the text nor grounded in the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the
Court is protecting values that emerge from a process of nonoriginalist judicial decisionmaking. Needless
to say, the identification and protection of unenumerated, nonoriginalist constitutional rights by the
4
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This Note examines PHA policies that ban ex-felons and arrestees from residing
with or visiting tenants in their complexes to illustrate that our current approach to
protecting familial rights from governmental interference is insufficient in sensitive areas,
like housing. It is helpful to view the problem through the lens of public housing bans for
two reasons. First, discriminatory housing bans quite literally disrupt families. The lack
of heightened judicial review despite the policies’ consequences demonstrates the
vulnerability of familial rights. Second, recent Supreme Court decisions, stemming from
Justice Kennedy’s landmark opinion Obergefell v. Hodges,8 known for securing marriage
equality, makes attempts at bolstering familial rights most likely to succeed in the realm
of housing. Now, married families in public housing have legitimate claims that housing
bans infringe upon their marital union, which is constitutionally protected under
Obergefell.9 If married families successfully leverage Obergefell, constitutionallymandated relief becomes contingent upon whether one attains a particular status—
marriage—and as such, relief is not still available to all families. This Note envisions a
future where such an arbitrary differentiator traditionally utilized to treat nonmarital
families as somehow “less than” will become the very vehicle to expanding the
constitutional right to family sanctity for all families.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of the organizational
structure of public housing. It then details the pattern of racially-biased practices in the
realm of public housing, ending with public housing bans and the consequences of family
separation generally. It concludes by summarizing cases where the constitutionality of
public housing bans is contested.
Part II begins by demonstrating that while the Supreme Court has consistently
afforded families heightened protection from government interference, families living in.
public housing complexes remain vulnerable because the Supreme Court’s cases are not
considered collectively. Then Part II contends that advocates may utilize Obergefell to
expand the right to family sanctity by urging the Supreme Court to adopt a penumbratype approach to interpreting the scope of the right to marriage. Part II concludes with a
description of the legal framework under the proposed penumbra-type approach.
Part III hypothesizes that once advocates establish the right to marriages
encompasses the right for spouses to cohabitate through Obergefell, they can then
challenge public housing bans infringing upon non-marital families under the Equal
Protection Clause. Part III concludes by analogizing the future of Obergefell to the legacy
of Griswold and Eisenstadt.10

unelected Supreme Court-with the Court nullifying legislative judgments on fundamental questions of
political morality-is a highly controversial practice. As a result, it is hardly surprising that some have
condemned the entire enterprise of substantive due process, calling it an unjustified judicial usurpation of
political power and a flagrant violation of the basic principle of majoritarian self-government.”).
8
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
9
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Obergefell, struck down same-sex marriage bans on the
grounds that the fundamental right to marriage includes the right to marry a same-sex partner. See Mark
Strasser, Obergefell, Dignity, and the Family, 19 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 317, 319 (2016). The
declaration of marriage equality was not necessarily unanticipated, but Justice Kennedy’s approach in
deriving the right surprised lawyers and scholars paying close attention. Id. at 317-18.
10
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
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I.

PUBLIC HOUSING IN AMERICA

In the United States, public housing “provide[s] affordable housing for the
financially disadvantaged.”11 As of 2010, approximately two million residents lived in
one of the 14,000 developments.12 The following section details the role of the federal
and state governments in public housing, identifies policy initiatives that
disproportionately impact communities of color, and reviews the constitutional tools
available to public housing tenants challenging government action.
A. Organizational Structure of Public Housing
This Note focuses on public housing complexes that are federally-subsidized, stateowned developments overseen by public housing authorities (PHAs).13 PHAs are created
under state laws and are responsible for managing the day-to-day operations of public
housing complexes.14 The federal government, through the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), provides PHAs with financial and professional
assistance.15 HUD purports to grant PHAs the “maximum amount of responsibility and
flexibility in program administration.”16 In practice, however, it is unclear whether PHAs
are sufficiently detached from HUD.17 The responsiveness of PHAs to federal political
pressure to target drug offenders in the 1980s suggests skepticism towards the notion that
PHAs are independent from HUD.
B. Racial Bias in Public Housing Policies
A brief summary of the evolution of racist housing policies implemented by the
government is helpful insofar as it provides support for viewing purportedly legitimate
justifications for housing bans with great skepticism.
During the conception of public housing in the early 1930s, the government
constructed housing developments exclusively for Black people in underdeveloped areas
of towns.18 The geographic placement of homes for Black people was partially limited
because of legally enforced racially restrictive covenants and similar policies.19 During
the 1950s, Federal Housing Authority (FHA) loans helped White families rapidly relocate
into suburban neighborhoods20 because housing was cheaper and economic activities
11

Jamie L. Wershbale, The Second Amendment under a Government Landlord: Is There a Right to Keep
and Bear Legal Firearms in Public Housing?, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 995, 1000 (2010).
12
Id. at 997–98.
13
The focus is narrow, because in the litigation presupposed, tenants will need to demonstrate there is
“government action” and cannot do so under other housing assistance programs, including vouchers.
14
Wershbale, supra note 11, at 1000-01.
15
See id. at 1001.
16
Id. at 1000–01.
17
See Martin D. Abravanel, Is Public Housing Ready for Freedom?, URBAN INST. (Apr. 1, 2004),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/57301/1000631-Is-Public-Housing-Ready-ForFreedom-.PDF.
18
MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., PUBLIC HOUSING AND THE LEGACY OF SEGREGATION 4 (2008).
19
See generally John Kimble, Insuring Inequality: The Role of the Federal Housing Authority in the Urban
Ghettoization of African Americans, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 399 (2009). Restrictive covenants are contracts
that prohibit certain races from occupying a particular neighborhood. Id. at 411.
20
See John M. Stahura, Suburban Development, Black Suburbanization and the Civil Rights Movement
Since World War II, 51 AM. SOCIO. REV. 131, 132 (1986).
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were also moving to the suburbs.21 The opportunities for Black families to take advantage
of the benefits of suburbanization were limited because of discriminatory policies in the
administration of FHA loans22 and exclusionary zoning ordinances, amongst other
government policies.23 As a result, many Black families of all economic circumstances
found themselves restricted to urban areas.24
The federal government then launched its “urban renewal” program, justified by the
increasing and entrenched urban poverty during the 1950s and 1960s.25 Urban renewal
generally referred to policies authorizing state and local governments to eliminate urban
blight.26 In reality, urban renewal meant “driving poor people out of their homes, i.e.,
black and minority removal, and building on the vacated premises luxury housing and
commercial projects. . . profitable to speculators.”27 At the start of the urban renewal era,
Congress passed the Housing Act of 1949, which called for the construction of 135,000
public housing units per year for six years beginning in 1950.28 Perhaps unsurprisingly,
Congress ultimately only approved funding for between one-sixth and two-fifths of the
promised 135,000 units each year.29 States and localities hoping to receive federal funds
responded by drafting plans for buildings that maximized the number units built at the
lowest cost point.30 Alas, the infamous “high-rise” housing projects were birthed.
The high-rise projects were different than the designs proposed during the 1930s
when the concept of public housing was first proposed as a vehicle to help White and
Black families.31 These new high-rise projects may be characterized as “steel and
concrete developments. . . surrounded by fields of extreme poverty” and for all effective
purposes, were removed from mainstream society.32
By the early 1980s, conditions in high-rise projects had deteriorated due to incomebased tenant selection policies, which resulted in a high number of unemployed tenants.
To make matters worse, inadequate funding for security resulted in hazardous

21

See id.
Discriminatory policies included outright refusal to ensure mortgages as well as requiring developers to
include clauses in deeds prohibiting resales to Black people in the future. See Richard Rothstein, Public
Housing: Government-Sponsored Segregation, THE AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 11, 2012),
https://prospect.org/article/public-housing-government-sponsored-segregation.
23
Id. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).
24
LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES: FROM
PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA 20 (U. Chi. Press eds. 2000).
25
TURNER, supra note 18, at 4.
26
Richard Freeman, The 1949 Housing Act versus ‘Urban Renewal’, in 23 EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE REV.
(EIR) 27, 28 (1996).
27
Id. at 28–29.
28
Id. at 28.
29
Id.
30
See D. Bradford Hunt, How Did Public Housing Survive the 1950s? 17 J. POL’Y HIST. 193, 210 (2005).
31
See SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, AMERICAN PROJECT: THE RISE AND FALL OF A MODERN GHETTO 18
(2000) (“The public housing project therefore continues to be laid out as a ‘community unit’ as large as
possible and entirely divorced from its neighborhood surroundings, even though this only dramatizes the
segregation of charity-case families. Standardization is emphasized rather than alleviated in project design,
as a glorification of efficient productions methods and an expression of the goal of decent, safe and sanitary
housing for all.”).
32
Id.
22
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conditions.33 During the “tough on crime” era, politicians eager for constituents’ support
politicized and further dehumanized the Black and brown tenants in these state-created
pockets of crime and isolation by making promises to (over)police public housing
complexes.34
C. History & Characteristics of Public Housing Bans
In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act which required PHAs to evict
tenants if they, any of their household members, or guests engaged in criminal activity on
or near the complex.35 This was the first act that targeted public housing tenants
exclusively, but many followed after President Bill Clinton’s 1996 State of the Union
Address, when he declared: “If you break the law, you no longer have a home in public
housing, one strike and you’re out. That should be the law everywhere in America.”36 In
April 1996, HUD issued its One Strike Guide to PHAs.37 The guide encouraged the PHAs
to utilize their authority to implement stringent screening practices and eviction
procedures.38
If the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Clinton’s passionate declaration, and HUD’s One
Strike Guide were insufficient to convince PHAs to evict tenants and reject applicants
based on perceived and past criminal behavior, HUD delivered the message by making
PHAs’ funding contingent on their ability to screen and evict ex-offenders.39 Congress
followed suit with the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA),
which conditioned PHAs’ funding on the implementation of successful screening
procedures and granted PHAs the discretion to determine what types of offenses could
lead to exclusion and the length of time the exclusion would last.40 The QHWRA is
perhaps most directly responsible for the wide variety of policies that exist today.41
Additionally, the One Strike Guide permitted PHAs to implement their own exclusion
criteria. This discretion created a multiple housing bans that vary broadly in regard to the
types of crimes that trigger ineligibility.
A practice among many PHAs is to reject applicants or evict tenants based solely
on arrest records, even when their charges were dropped or consist of minor, non-violent
offenses that are often correlated with poverty and are unrelated to applicants’ likelihood
of being “good” tenants.42 Corinne Casey, a researcher at Human Rights Watch,
describes one Black mother, P.C., who was denied housing because of one arrest four
33

TURNER, supra note 18, at 5.
See Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied Access to Public
Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 551, 563 (2005) (suggesting that housing bans may be a consequence of
the War on Drugs).
35
Id. at 560.
36
Id. at 560–61.
37
Id. at 561.
38
Id.
39
See generally Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L No. 105-276, 112 Stat.
2518 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
40
See Carey, supra note 34, at 562.
41
Janet Weiner, No-Trespass Policies in Public Housing 41 (Jan. 1, 2016) (unpublished Doctor of
Philosophy Dissertation) (on file with Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations),
https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3876&context=edissertations.
42
See Carey, supra note 34, at 566–67.
34
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years prior to her application; the mother declared, “It’s done and over with, it’s in the
past. I’m trying to do the right thing; I deserve a chance. Everyone deserves a chance.”43
P.C. was never convicted of the offense that triggered the denial of her application for
housing.44
It is also common for individuals who have been arrested or convicted of
disqualifying crimes to be ineligible for housing for periods of time much longer than the
sentence attached to the underlying conviction.45 Finally, where proposed tenants have a
criminal record, PHAs regularly neglect to perform case-by-case individualized reviews
of applications, as HUD guidelines advise. Instead, PHAs often implement blanket
denials for those with a criminal record.46 The characteristics of the bans demonstrate
why “rehabilitated,” hardworking people who previously broke the law, and their family
members, are almost categorically excluded from finding refuge from the disastrous
housing market in public housing. These practices in the implementation of bans suggest
that PHAs exclude more people than necessary to achieve their alleged government
purpose.
D. Family Separation as a Result of Public Housing Bans
There are broad and severe consequences of these overreaching bans, namely
family separation.47 Housing bans have the capacity to impact thousands of families.
According to the National Center for Health in Public Housing, over two million people
live in public housing, and children make up approximately 37% of public housing
residents.48 The negative implications of family separation, a probable consequence of
housing bans, cannot be overstated.
Familial compositions impact the socio-emotional, academic, and physical
development of children.49 For example, Robert Sampson and John Laub, criminologists
awarded for their work on crime and the life course and crime and public policy, found
that “family dysfunction50 . . . [can] increase the propensity of the individual’s life course
toward criminal behavior.”51 Family dysfunction may appear in the form of abuse or
negative characteristics, such as those stemming from the forced separation a housing ban
43

Id. at 545.
Id.
45
See id. at 569. Exclusion periods differ between counties and cities, but the trend of excessive periods is
consistent. A misdemeanor conviction for marijuana in New York City may lead to a five-year ban from
PHAs, but a criminal sentence of probation for six months. Similarly, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, a
conviction for a violent felony can lead to lifetime ineligibility regardless of evidence of rehabilitation.
46
See id. at 572. The failure to perform case-by-case reviews suggests that the policy infringing upon the
constitutional rights of applicants may not be narrowly tailored.
47
Id. at 584. In analyzing a substantive due process or equal protection challenge under strict scrutiny (as
proposed), courts may be less convinced by allegedly compelling needs proffered by the government if
courts understand (1) that PHA bans are often overly broad and (2) such bans have severe ramifications.
48
Nat’l Ctr. for Health in Pub. Housing, Demographic Facts: Residents Living in Public Housing (May 31,
2016), https://nchph.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Demographics-Fact-Sheet-2016-1.pdf.
49
See Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 167, 170 (2015). See generally Lisa Strohschein et al., Family Structure Histories and High School
Completion: Evidence from a Population-Based Registry, 34 CAN. J. SOC. 83, 83–103 (2009).
50
Defined: John H. Laub et al., Assessing Sampson and Laub’s Life Course Theory of Crime, in 15
ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 313-33 (Francis T. Cullen et al. eds., 2006).
51
Id.
44
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may cause. Similarly, Robert Agnew’s “general strain theory” suggests that familial
stress leads to feelings of loss or anger, which strains the expected conditions of
relationships and pushes people to compensate for the strain by engaging in delinquency
or crime.52
The majority of these studies do not discuss the scenario of “intact” families, which
for the purposes of this Note, are families who live separately because of public housing
bans but otherwise function as one unit. Instead, studies primarily look solely at families
separated due to divorce or incarceration. These families may face different hardships
that alter the correlation between their composition and future delinquency or criminality.
Nonetheless, the aforementioned studies are relevant because family stress is generally
linked to subsequent discord and forced separation almost indefinitely results in family
stress.53
Literature surrounding “non-resident”54 parents also provides helpful insight into
the consequences of housing bans because the cause of the familial separation is less
pertinent than the mere fact and consequences of the separation itself.55 These studies
often focus on “contact levels” between non-resident parents and their children,56 as
scholars believe that the removal of a parent from a child’s life, rather than the physical
separation alone, causes negative outcomes for the child.57 Generally, higher contact rates
between non-resident parents and their children result in less familial stress.58 Contact
rates between non-resident fathers and their children increase where fathers are employed
and have high educational attainment and decrease when either parent begins
cohabitating with a new partner.59
Currently, no empirical studies focus on contact rates between non-resident parents
and children who reside in a public housing complex where the non-resident parent is
banned from visiting or residing. Thus, it is difficult to know whether educational
attainment or employment status correlates with higher contact levels in these scenarios.
If a similar trend does exist, however, it is particularly alarming as ex-felons often
struggle to obtain meaningful employment.60
More research is needed to determine the impact of housing bans on “intact”
families. However, existing scholarship demonstrates that the separation forced by
52

See Robert Agnew, Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency, 30
CRIMINOLOGY 47, 49 (1992).
53
John H. Laub et al., supra note 50.
54
Non-resident parents refers to parents living separately from their children.
55
This line of literature is similarly limited because it tends to focus on the inter-parental relationship and
resident parents’ as “gatekeepers,” which is unlikely to be the case in intact families forced to be separated.
See generally Daniel N. Hawkins et al., Parent-Adolescent Involvement: The Relative Influence of Parent
Gender and Residence, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 125 (2006); Graeme B. Wilson, The Non-Resident
Parental Role for Separated Fathers: A Review, 20 INT’L. J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 286 (2006).
56
Note that the majority of studies on non-resident parents focus on fathers as non-resident parents since
mothers are more likely to be the residential parent. This trend is not necessarily problematic because
housing bans are more likely to impact men.
57
See Wilson, supra note 55, at 287.
58
Id.
59
See id. at 290.
60
See Patricia M. Harris & Kimberly S. Keller, Ex-Offenders Need Not Apply: The Criminal Background
Check in Hiring Decisions, 21 J. CONTEM. CRIM. JUST. 6, 6 (2005) (“Most states have enacted various laws
that make it difficult, if not impossible, for ex-offenders to acquire employment, regardless of their work
history or risk of reoffending.”).
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housing bans is likely to cause negative outcomes for both children and parents.61 Contact
levels between non-resident parents and children will presumably be lower due to
economic and educational predicaments compounded by the additional burden for nonresident parents to join shared family activities when they cannot visit the residential
family home.
E. Limited Success of Constitutional Challenges to Public Housing Bans
In light of the negative consequences of public housing bans, and the persistence of
racist housing policies in the United States, is it unsurprising advocates and families have
consistently challenged the bans’ constitutionality. The cases described in this subpart
illustrate how courts have routinely rejected challenges brought under the First and
Fourteenth amendments. To appreciate the rationale provided for these rejections, it is
helpful to understand the legal framework lawyers must rely on in these claims.
1. First Amendment: Right to Intimate Association
The right to intimate association, derived from the First Amendment, is premised
on the belief that the State cannot unjustifiably interfere with “highly personal
relationships” because the decision to enter these relationships is central to the concept of
individual liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.62 Step one, then, is determining whether
a relationship is “intimate” for constitutional purposes.63 Once plaintiffs surpass this
hurdle, they must demonstrate that the challenged state action amounts to “unwarranted
state interference.”64 The Court is not particularly clear on the standard of review it
applies to determine the permissibility of state interference on intimate associations. The
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roberts v. Jaycees provides insight the most insight. The
Court indicates that the lower courts may provide “varying degrees of protection” to
intimate associations, with family relationships receiving the most protection and
business relationships receiving the least.65
The Supreme Court has explicitly held that familial relationships, including
cohabitation with relatives, fall within the right to intimate association.66 Thus, tenant-

See Ann Mooney et al., Impact of Family Breakdown on Children’s Well-being: Evidence Review, INST.
11 (2009) (noting that “the quality of parenting and of parent-child
relationship often diminishes with separation. . .” and that “lone parenthood reduces the time and attention
that is available for children[,]” increasing the likelihood that children suffer from behavioral problems).
62
See Nancy Leong, The First Amendment and Fair Housing in the Platform Economy, 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
1001, 1012 (2017); see also Joshua P. Roling, Functional Intimate Association Analysis: A Doctrinal Shift
to Save the Roberts Framework, 61 DUKE L.J. 903, 908 (2012).
63
In determining whether relationships are “intimate,” courts consider the following factors, amongst
others: size, purpose, selectivity, and seclusion from others. See Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620
(1984).
64
See id. at 619; see also Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 385 F.3d 935, 945 (6th Cir. 2004) (recognizing
that while “[T]he freedom of intimate association is coextensive with the right of privacy; both the freedom
of intimate association and the right of privacy describe that body of rights that protect[s] intimate human
relationships from unwarranted intrusion or interference by the state.”).
65
Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO.
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 269, 278–279 n.55 (2006).
66
See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
61
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plaintiffs’ primarily hurdle in intimate relationship cases is convincing courts the state
action is unwarranted.
2. Fourteenth Amendment
Tenants and their advocates have also challenged housing bans under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.67
i. Due Process
Procedural due process claims are analyzed according to a three-part test: (1)
whether there is state or governmental action; (2) whether the state action affects private
interests; and (3) whether there is a risk of erroneous deprivation of a private interest
affected by the state action.68 The risk of erroneous deprivation is determined through an
evaluation of procedural safeguards triggered before the deprivation occurs.69 Courts
balance the interest of the government and the private individual to determine whether
the procedural safeguards adopted are sufficient.70
Substantive due process claims similarly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that a
state or governmental action deprived the individual of a liberty interest.71 Then, once
these prongs are satisfied, the government must produce a justification for the
deprivation.72 Courts determine whether the proffered justification is sufficient through a
“means-end” analysis.73 The level of scrutiny exercised in this means-end analysis
depends on whether the government action deprived the individual of a fundamental
right.74 Government action infringing upon fundamental rights or liberty interests are
subjected to strict scrutiny, which requires the government to prove that the infringement
is “necessary to further a compelling interest” and that it is narrowly tailored.75 If the
government action does not infringe upon a fundamental right, rational basis review
applies, and state action is generally upheld.76
ii. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: “No State shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”77 Laws often
inherently draw distinctions among categories of people, so the issue in equal protection
67

Infra pt. I(E)3.
See James M. Klein & John E. Schrider Jr., Procedural Due Process and the Section 8 Leased Housing
Program, 66 KY. L.J. 304, 344 (1977).
69
See id.
70
See id. at 331.
71
See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 625, 626
(1992).
72
See id. at 627.
73
See id. at n.12 (“Means-end scrutiny is an analytical process used to evaluate the government’s
justification for conduct that harms individuals. In applying means-end scrutiny, courts examine the
purposes (ends) which government conduct is designed to serve and the methods (means) chosen to further
those purposes.”).
74
Id. at 627. Fundamental rights are enumerated in the Constitution or identified by the Supreme Court.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
68
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claims is not whether the statute treats all people in exactly the same way, but whether a
particular classification is permissible.78
Laws distinguishing on any basis other than race, national origin, or gender79 are
traditionally subject to rational basis review.80 Courts overturn very few laws under
rational basis review because the government is only required to provide “any
conceivable rational basis” that justifies the legislation.81 As a result, laws distinguishing
on the basis of race, and thus subject to strict scrutiny where the government is forced to
articulate the law serves a “compelling government interest” and is “narrowly tailored” to
minimize discrimination, are significantly more likely to be overturned.82 However,
“facially neutral” laws that irrefutably disproportionately impact racial minorities,
including housing bans, are not subject to this more searching review intended to protect
vulnerable populations.83
It is highly unlikely that public housing tenants will prevail on a disparate impact
theory of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.84 To do so, plaintifftenants have to demonstrate the PHA issuing the challenged public housing ban intended
to discriminate on the basis of race.85 Evidence that public housing bans
disproportionately impact Black and Latinx people, without a showing of such intent to
discriminate, is insufficient.86 To be clear, however, public housing bans do
disproportionally impact communities of color.
First, racial disparities at every stage in the criminal justice system lead to a
disproportionate percentage of minorities being imprisoned.87 Second, approximately
sixty percent of households living in public housing are Black or Latinx.88 Thus, public

78

See Ben Geiger, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1206
(2006).
79
Id. at 1207.
80
Id. at 1206–08 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938); Williamson
v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 435 (1955); and FCC v. Beach Commc’n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 309 (1993)).
81
Id. at 1207.
82
Id. at 1206.
83
See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding proof of discriminatory racial purpose
is required in equal protection challenges based on a law’s disparate impact on a particular race, and
consequently, placing an almost insurmountable burden on plaintiffs in an era where implicit bias is more
commonplace than overt racism).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 239.
87
Julia A. Ebenstein, The Geography of Mass Incarceration: Prison Gerrymandering and the Dilution of
Prisoners’ Political Representation, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 323, 334 (2018).
88
I find it important to note that I am not intentionally continuing the pattern of disregarding the
overrepresentation of Native Americans in the criminal justice system. See The Sentencing Project, Race &
Justice News: Native Americans in the Justice System (Mar. 28, 2016),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/news/race-justice-news-native-americans-in-the-justice-system/. My
decision to focus primarily on Black and Latinx families is due to the fact that Native Americans are less
likely to be impacted by housing bans because they do not make up a significant percentage of public
housing residents; U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., Resident Characteristics Report (Dec. 2018),
https://pic.hud.gov/pic/RCRPublic/rcrmain.asp.
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housing bans on the basis of criminal arrests or convictions are more likely to impact
families of color.89
3. Strengthening Familial Protections in the Courtroom: A Summary of Relevant Cases
Challenging Housing Bans
Challenges to public housing evictions and bans on the basis of criminal
convictions reached the Supreme Court in the early 2000s. In Department of Housing and
Urban Development v. Rucker,90 four tenant-plaintiffs evicted under the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act alleged their evictions violated the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
association and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.91 The Court held that
the tenants’ due process claim failed because the government was “acting as a landlord of
property” as opposed to criminally punishing or civilly regulating “members of the
general populace.”92 As a result, the tenant-plaintiffs failed to fulfill the “state action”
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.93
The Court similarly rejected the tenants’ freedom of association claim in a single
sentence in a footnote reasoning that its decision in Lyng v. Automobile Workers94
foreclosed the argument. In Lyng, the Court upheld the Food Stamp Act on the grounds
that precluding household eligibility for food stamps where members were on strike does
not unconstitutionally infringe upon the right to associate with their families because the
Act does not prohibit families from dining together or otherwise “directly and
substantially” interfere with family living arrangements.95 Since the Court did not
actually analyze Lyng’s applicability to Rucker, Judge Sneed’s application in his
dissenting opinion from the 9th Circuit is the most informative.96 Judge Sneed reasons
that the associational rights of the family members deprived of food stamps because one
member was on strike in Lyng, like the tenants barred from public housing because one
member’s arrest or conviction in Rucker, are “implicated” but not in “significant danger”
because of the withdrawal of the government benefit.97 Further, the Court is deferential to
the congressional view of “what constitutes wise economic or social policy.”98
One year after Rucker, in Virginia v. Hicks, a barred individual brought suit against
a Richmond public housing development’s ban policy under the First Amendment after
being convicted of trespass for trying to return to the development.99 On the day that the
This disparity is evidenced by the fact that “a black child born today is less likely to be raised by both
parents than a black child during slavery.” MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 224 (2012).
90
535 U.S. 125 (2002).
91
Id. at 128, 136 n.6.
92
Id. at 135.
93
See Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment “State
Action” Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 222 (1976).
94
485 U.S. 360 (1988).
95
Id. at 365. Dismissal of the freedom of the association claims on these grounds illustrates the ambiguity
within the second prong of First Amendment intimate association claims briefly mentioned.
96
Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001).
97
Id. at 1139.
98
Id.
99
See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 115 (2003). The overbreadth doctrine invalidates enforcement of a
law that “punishes a substantial amount of protected free speech, in relation to statute’s plainly legitimate
sweep” unless a limiting construction narrows the law. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
89
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plaintiff, Hicks, was issued a summons for trespass, he informed the officer he was only
there to bring pampers for his baby.100 Hicks’s mother lived on the premises, and he had
asked the housing development’s manager, Mrs. Rogers, for permission to return on two
separate occasions to no avail.101 Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority
(RRHA) enacted a trespassing policy that authorized Richmond police officers to serve
persons on RRHA premises without “a legitimate business or social purpose” with notice
barring such persons from the premises and to arrest those who returned or refused to
leave.102 The Virginia Supreme Court held the RRHA policy was unconstitutionally
overbroad because the policy vested too much discretion in the individual housing
development’s manager.103 The concern over discretion resulted from an “unwritten rule”
where the manager would grant nonresidents permission to hand out flyers on the
sidewalks of the development.104 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that RHHA’s
policy was not facially invalid because there was no evidence that the policy
“prohibit[ed] a substantial amount of protected speech.”105
Despite these unsuccessful claims, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
challenged the Housing Authority of the City of Annapolis (HACA)’s policy of banning
individuals “who have been involved in or conduct criminal activity on or near public
housing”106 from being on HACA property on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds
in 2009.107 The ACLU responded to the government-as-private-landlord safeguard
discussed in Rucker by naming the city of Annapolis and Annapolis Police Department as
defendants.108 If the case had not settled, it would have proceeded on the theory that the
policy could only be upheld if it survived strict scrutiny. To prevail, the government
would have needed to demonstrate that the ban was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest because the City’s policy deprived tenants of their fundamental
right to freedom of association and suspended their First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights in the realm of public housing.109 Going forward, subjecting the housing policies to
strict scrutiny could drastically change the jurisprudence surrounding public housing
bans.
Rucker, Hicks, and City of Annapolis do not require the total abandonment of First
and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to housing bans. However, the intimate
association doctrine remains undeveloped and, as a result, lawsuits on this ground are
inherently vulnerable.110 Further, in equal protection claims, tenant-plaintiffs’ only hope
of receiving heightened scrutiny rests on successfully arguing that ex-felons are a
“discrete and insular minority” or introducing evidence of discriminatory intent in a
100

Hicks v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 678, 680 (2000).
Id.
102
Hicks, 539 U.S. at 124.
103
Id. at 115, 118.
104
Id. at 121.
105
Id. at 124.
106
See Weiner, supra note 41, at 179. (citing Annapolis Trespass Policy).
107
See Sharps v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Annapolis, Civil Case No. 02C09143799 (2009).
108
Weiner, supra note 41, at 53.
109
Id.
110
See Marcus, supra note 65, at 283 (“[T]wentieth century Supreme Court decisions that mentioned
intimate association only minimally addressed intimate association in terms of what it is not, without
providing meaningful guidance on what it is.”).
101

236

Vol. 15:2]

McKayla Stokes

disparate impact theory of discrimination on the basis of race. While there is merit to both
of these arguments, the likelihood that either one prevails in the housing context is far
from guaranteed.111 For these reasons, advocates should begin exploring less traditional
approaches to challenging public housing bans.
The remainder of this Note suggests that the Court’s decision Obergefell v. Hodges,
a case involving a right to marriage, may serve as a steppingstone to achieving a
constitutional right to family life that would then offer a novel angle from which to
approach a constitutional challenge to public housing bans.
II.

THE POSSIBILITY OF THE RIGHT TO FAMILY SANCTITY

Part II sets forth a pathway to securing broader constitutional protections for
families affected by public housing bans. A significant portion of Part II focuses on
Obergefell,112 the landmark marriage equality case because it creates holes that advocates
should exploit to push us closer to protecting all families regardless of marital status. To
the extent the discussion focuses on marital families, it is because the pathway proposed
requires advocates to: (1) secure protections for marital families and then (2) utilize the
equal protection clause to expand the newly developed protections to cover all families,
regardless of marital status.
Obergefell established a constitutional right to marriage without clarifying the
scope of that right.113 Parties have begun to utilize the resulting ambiguity to challenge
government actions that interfere with marital unions.114 Consequently, cases that turn on
how broadly or narrowly the right to marriage is interpreted will likely become more
frequent. Families injured by public housing bans are in a great position to urge courts to
rule that the right to marriage includes the right to live with one’s spouse. If courts adopt
this broader interpretation of the right to marriage, then PHA bans would be subject to
more stringent review.
A brief review of Supreme Court cases regarding government action touching
families provides support for a broad interpretation in the realm of family living
arrangements.
A. Seeds to a Future Right to Family Sanctity: Precedential Cases
The right to family life in the United States, whatever it encompasses, is a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.115 The
following subparts illustrate how the rights to family life and privacy in America have

Zach Newman, Hands Up, Don’t Shoot: Policing, Fatal Force, and Equal Protection in the Age of
Colorblindness, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 117, 139 (2015) (“Even when the laws have disparate impacts,
facially neutral laws receive strict scrutiny only where there is a proven discriminatory intent.”); see
Geiger, supra note 78, at 1992 (suggesting ex-offenders’ responsibility for their membership in the
classification and moral culpability serves as a “major doctrinal obstacle” to treatment as a suspect class).
112
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015).
113
See generally Kerry v. Din, 575 U.S. 86 (2015).
114
Id. See also Yafai v. Pompeo, 924 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2019) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that a
citizen’s “liberty interest in bringing [one’s] wife to America” cannot be deprived without a detailed
explanation of the grounds for inadmissibility.)
115
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
111
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evolved. Notably, the Supreme Court recognized a number of parental rights116 prior to
the expansion of privacy rights more generally after its landmark decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut.117
1. Development of Parental Rights
The evolution of a parental liberty to control the education of one’s children as a
liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment began in 1923 in Meyer v.
Nebraska.118 In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court held unconstitutional a state statute
prohibiting persons from teaching any foreign languages to children who have not
successfully passed the eighth grade.119 The Court explained that legislative action
interfering with a recognized liberty interest, including the right of parents to give their
children the education “suitable to their station in life,”120 may only be upheld if it is
“reasonably relat[ed] to some purpose within the competency of the state to effect.”121
After clarifying the standard, the Court conceded that the proffered purpose of the statute,
fostering a homogeneous community with American ideals,122 was permissible. However,
the Court held the statute was unconstitutional because the “means adopted . . . exceed
the limitations upon the power of the State.”123 Thus, it appears the Court applied a
proportionality-based inquiry despite purporting to determine the statute’s
constitutionality based on a mere relation to a permissible purpose.
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,124 parental
liberty was reinterpreted as encompassing a general right of parents to direct the
upbringing, including their education decisions, of children under their care.125 Similarly
to its reasoning in Meyer, the Court recited a “reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competency of the State”126 as the test deployed to determine the constitutionality of
the Oregon law127 that effectively criminalized parents for not sending their children to
public school. The holding, however, may be better understood as a categorical
prohibition against “standardizing children” by precluding them from attending private
institutions.128
The scope of parental liberty interests outside of the context of education was first
raised in Prince v. Massachusetts in 1944.129 Mrs. Prince, accused and convicted of

I characterize parental and marital protections as a type of broader “familial right” for the purposes of
this paper.
117
381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
118
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
119
See id. at 402.
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Id. at 400.
121
Id.
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See id. at 402.
123
Id.
124
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
125
See id. at 534-35.
126
Id. at 535.
127
Id.
128
See id.; Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-507 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), and holding that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional because the state lacks general power to
standardize children).
129
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159 (1944).
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violating state child labor laws,130 challenged the constitutionality of the statutes on the
grounds that they infringed on her First Amendment right to freedom of religion and her
Fourteenth Amendment parental right.131 Notably, the majority opinion completely
omitted the “reasonable relation” language and instead noted the “state has a wide range
of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s
welfare.”132 The Court’s inconsistent language affords government actors less or more
discretion over children, depending on the circumstances. While such an approach is
reasonable, its indirect application makes it difficult to determine how future cases will
be reviewed.
2. Right to Privacy
After the notion of parental rights was developed throughout the early-to-mid
1900s, the Supreme Court continued to use the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to limit state action in spaces and relationships that had been traditionally
understood as private, including the marital relationship. Griswold v. Connecticut,133 best
known as establishing a fundamental right to privacy,134 simultaneously established the
specific right to marital privacy. Justice Frankfurter used the Court’s holdings in Meyer
and Pierce135 to bolster his theory that attached to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights are
“penumbral rights” which create zones of privacy.136 On this line of reasoning, the Court
struck down the Connecticut statute forbidding the sale of contraceptives as
unconstitutional on the grounds that the regulation swept “unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade[d] the area of protected freedoms” understood as privacy in the marriage
relationship.137
3. Family Life
In 1974, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a New York village
ordinance limiting one-family dwellings to “traditional families” or to groups of two
unrelated persons in the Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.138 The ordinance defined family
as “one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage.”139 The Court held the
Id.; Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 149 §§ 80-81 (2019) (enforcing provisions of Massachusetts’ child labor law
prohibiting boys and girls under 12 from selling newspapers).
131
See Prince, 321 U.S. at 164.
132
Id. at 167.
133
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
134
See generally David Helscher, Griswold v. Connecticut and the Unenumerated Right to Privacy, 15 N.
ILL. U.L. REV. 33 (1994).
135
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus &
Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
136
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–83 (“The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor
is the Bill of Rights. The Right to Educate a child in a school of the parents’ choice – whether private or
parochial—is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study any particular subject or foreign language. Yet
the First Amendment has been construed to include certain of those rights... without those peripheral rights
the specific rights would be less secure. And so we affirm the principle of the Pierce and Mayer case.”).
137
Id. at 485.
138
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974). Note that ordinances are considered “economic
and social legislation” which are upheld as long as the legislation is “reasonable, not arbitrary,” and bears a
“rational relationship to a permissible state objective.”
139
Id. at 2.
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ordinance to be constitutional because it did not ban forms of association because it
permitted residents to entertain whomever they liked.140 In contrast, three years later, in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio,141 the Court overturned East Cleveland’s zoning
ordinance. The Court reasoned that limiting occupancy of dwellings to members of a
single family violated due process where family was defined in a manner that “intrudes
on choices concerning family living arrangements.”142 In Moore, a grandmother was
convicted of violating the ordinance because she lived with her son and two grandsons—
who were first cousins rather than siblings.143 The majority reasoned the “strong
constitutional protection of the sanctity of the family established in numerous decisions
of th[e] Court extends to the family choice involved in th[e] case and is not confined
within an arbitrary boundary drawn at the limits of the nuclear family.”144 In short,
because the ordinance intruded upon choices concerning one’s family life, the usual
judicial deference afforded to legislatures was replaced with a more searching inquiry
into the importance of the governmental interests served and the extent to which the
regulation served these interests.145 The Court’s reasoning in Moore seems
straightforward in light of the cases previously discussed. The Court was more concerned
with governmental interference with personal decisions regarding one’s marital or family
choices.146
B. Right to Marriage
Despite recognizing the right to marital privacy in 1965147 and the importance of
the marital union in American society long before that,148 the Court did not recognize a
fundamental right to marry until 2015 in Obergefell v. Hodges.149 The Court offered four
principles to support its holding: (1) that the concept of individual autonomy
encompasses the right to make personal choices concerning marriage; (2) that the right of
intimate association accompanying marriage must be afforded to both same-sex couples
and opposite-sex couples; (3) that the right to marriage protects children and families
already afforded constitutional protection in private matters; and (4) that marriage should
be understood as the “keystone of the Nation’s social order.”150
While Obergefell is widely celebrated by many for recognizing discrimination on
the basis of sexual-orientation is contrary to American values, the decision complicates

140

See id. at 17.
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
142
Id. at 499.
143
Id. at 496–97.
144
Id. at 494.
145
See id. at 499.
146
Id. at 498–99 (“distinguishing the ordinance in Belle Terre from that in Moore because the former
“expressly allowed all who were related by “blood, adoption, or marriage to live together” while the latter
“has chosen to regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing deeply into the family itself.” The Court’s
lack of judicial review and general approach to protecting the “sanctity of the family” has been far less
stable and more problematic in cases concerning public housing policies banning ex-felons and similar
classes of people).
147
See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
148
See generally Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1988); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
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See id. at 2589-2590.
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the jurisprudence surrounding familial rights.151 Many components of family life are still
left unprotected from state interference under the Court’s approach to the fundamental
right to marriage in Obergefell, despite the recognition of a right to marital privacy and
right to parental liberty decades earlier.
Although there is a general consensus that Obergefell established a fundamental
right to marriage, some scholars argue otherwise.152 The success of the argument that
Obergefell provides additional constitutional safeguards from government interference in
familial spaces turns on this point of tension. As such, this Note first demonstrates that
Obergefell does in fact establish a constitutional right to marriage under the Substantive
Due Process Clause (SDP).153 Afterwards, this Note addresses the question of how the
right to marriage should be interpreted.
1. Substantive Due Process & The Right to Marriage
While there is significant jurisprudential uncertainty around the SDP broadly, the
fundamental right to marriage articulated in Obergefell remains good law. The concept of
substantive due process exists because the Supreme Court reasoned that the word
“liberty” in the due process clause is not “define[d] with exactness.”154 As a result, the
Court must determine what individual “rights” are “liberty interests” that trigger
heightened constitutional protection.155 Challenges to Obergefell’s legitimacy may be
more attributable to the conflicting state of our substantive due process jurisprudence,
outlined below, than the highly political debate over marriage equality itself. The conflict
exists, in part, because the Court has relied upon conflicting theories to identify
substantive due process rights.156
The most restrictive theory only extends constitutional protection to “liberties that
are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”157 Justices ascribing to the
“deeply rooted” theory of substantive due process normally require a “‘careful
151

See generally Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. 2584.
See Ilya Somin, A Great Decision on Same-Sex Marriage—But Based on Dubious Reasoning, WASH.
POST (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/26/a-greatdecision-on-same-sex-marriage-but-based-on-dubious-reasoning/?utm_term=.60c28dfb88e2 (critiquing
Justice Kennedy’s legal analysis for failure to “clearly conclude that either the Due Process Clause or the
Equal Protection Clause by itself creates a right to same-sex marriage” because “if a sufficient important
right (Due Process Clause) is denied for discriminatory reasons (Equal Protection), then the Fourteenth
Amendment has been violated. However, both the criteria for what makes the right important enough and
the criteria for proving discrimination seem extremely vague.”).
153
Loving v. Virginia held that classifications on the grounds of race or sexual orientation in marital statutes
are unconstitutional. 388 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1967). Since Loving addressed discriminatory classifications, it is
most appropriately characterized as an equal protection case. Obergefell is distinguishable from Loving
because Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, relied heavily on the due process clause. Id. By
interpreting the right to marriage as a fundamental liberty interest protected under the due process clause,
Justice Kennedy ensured any governmental action infringing on the right to marriage would be subjected to
heightened judicial protection. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501,
1502 (1999) (“Substantive means the government must show a compelling reason that would demonstrate
an adequate justification for [interfering with a fundamental liberty interest].”).
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Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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See Conkle, supra note 7, at 66.
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See generally id.
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description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”158 A second theory, referred to
as the theory of “reasoned judgement,” permits the Court to evaluate the liberty interest
in question and weigh it against competing governmental concerns to determine whether
the substantive due process clause is implicated.159 This theory is most explicitly applied
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,160 where the Court
reaffirmed women’s right to abortion on the basis of “reasoned judgement” in addition to
the principle of precedent.161 A third and final theory was introduced in Lawrence v.
Texas,162 which overturned Bowers v. Hardwick163 on the grounds that consenting adults
have a liberty interest in sexual relations. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in
Lawrence, reasoned that evolving national values, rather than history alone, are relevant
in identifying liberty interests because the Framers “[k]new times can blind us to certain
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact
serve only to oppress.”164
While the stability of substantive due process jurisprudence generally may be
unstable because of conflicting approaches, surely Justice Kennedy’s reliance on
substantive due process in Obergefell is not meritless. In other words, Obergefell is no
more likely to be overturned than other controversial substantive due process cases.165
Though the validity of the substantive due process doctrine is beyond the scope of this
Note, the relevant takeaway for present purposes is that the fundamental right to marriage
articulated in Obergefell remains good law. The pivotal question is whether the right to
marriage may be extended to preserve family unity.
C. Getting to a Shared Household
The right to marriage should be interpreted broadly. Justice Douglas addressed the
problems inherent in adopting a formalistic approach to protecting constitutional rights in
Griswold v. Connecticut.166 Justice Douglas reasoned that “without . . . those peripheral
rights the specific rights would be less secure.”167 As a result, the principle of penumbras
was born.168 The principle protects rights by preventing unduly narrow interpretations
from “deny[ing] force and often meaning” of the rights.169 Under the principle of
158

Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 154 (2015).
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Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
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381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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penumbras, state regulation cannot arbitrarily encroach upon a specific right and
emancipations that “help give [that right] life and substance.”170
Applying the controversial principle of penumbras in the unsettled substantive due
process context is complex because the doctrine varies greatly from the Bill of Rights,
but the need to ensure rights are given their full force and meaning exists whether the
right is enumerated or unenumerated.171 The weaknesses within the substantive due
process doctrine should not justify departure from principled constitutional norms. The
right to get married serves little purpose if the government is then free to interfere with
critical areas of the marital union, such as cohabitation.
Kerry v. Din provides helpful insight into whether the Supreme Court may be
receptive to interpreting the right to marriage as encompassing interconnected interests,
like cohabitation.172 In Din, an American citizen reasoned the government’s denial of her
husband’s visa application deprived her of her constitutional right to live with her
spouse.173 The dissent, signed on by four Justices, reasoned that the “institution of
marriage, which encompasses the right of spouses to live together” is the kind of
constitutional interest afforded procedural protections under the due process clause.174
The plurality assumed that Din had a protected liberty interest for the purposes of the
case, which was decided according to immigration principles.175 Since normal
constitutional norms are not applied in immigration, the most important takeaway from
Din is that at least four, and possibly six, Justices believe the right to marriage
encompasses ancillary rights, one of which could be cohabitation.176
D. Leveraging the Penumbras Principle to Combat Public Housing Bans
Applying the penumbras principle to public housing bans impacting married
persons requires: (1) identifying which right(s) are peripheral to the right to marriage; and
(2) determining whether a public housing policy sweeps unnecessarily broadly and
invades an area of protected freedoms.177
Justice Kennedy’s summary of the principles and traditions that demonstrate
marriage is a “fundamental” right under the Constitution similarly support the notion that
living in the same household as one’s spouse should be understood as peripheral to the
right to marry. Particularly relevant are: (1) the principle in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence that marriage is a “two-person union unlike any other in its importance to
the committed individuals” and (2) the tradition of using marriage as a means of
safeguarding children and families.178 On this point, Kennedy reasons that marriage
offers stability and predictability that protects children raised by married parents from an
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“uncertain family life.”179 This language reflects society’s understanding of marriage as a
proxy for a two-parent shared household.180
As a result, the constitutionality of public housing policies that infringe upon the
right of married persons to cohabitate—a fundamental right—turns on whether the policy
is “necessary to further a compelling interest” and narrowly tailored to this goal.181 As
discussed, the “compelling interest” requirement is a more stringent standard than the
“legitimate government interest” standard courts have consistently held housing bans
satisfy.182 However, it seems unlikely that courts will hold PHAs’ interest in decreasing
drugs and crimes in complexes known for being dangerous as not “compelling.” The
constitutionality of the public housing bans, then, will likely turn on the scope of a
particular ban under this framework. Policies sweeping unnecessarily broadly, like those
banning applicants due to arrests not resulting in convictions or those that impose unduly
long lengths of time for when bans apply, would presumably be unable to pass
constitutional muster in the proposed approach.
III.

ASPIRATIONS FOR THE FUTURE: A RIGHT TO FAMILY SANCTITY UNCONNECTED TO
MARRIAGE

The proposed pathway to subjecting public housing bans to heightened scrutiny by
expanding the penumbra’s principle to encompass fundamental liberty interests is only
the first step in the right direction—not the finish line. The goal is a fundamental right to
family sanctity detached from marital status. It is clear that Obergefell does not get us
here, but it may get us closer.
Importantly, Justice Kennedy’s view of marriage as “reflecting the ideals of family
and central to social order,”183 implicitly endorses society’s problematic tendency of
ostracizing non-marital families.184 Since marriage rates are declining, the practical effect
of expanding constitutional protections for marital unions will be minimal.185 This is

179

Id. at 2590. Of course, this language is also problematic in that it perpetuates the stereotype that twoparent households led by unmarried parents and single-parent households are inherently less stable. As
discussed in Part III, however, this stereotypical evidence can strengthen the equal protection claim
nonmarital families launch in response to differential treatment on the basis of marital status.
180
See David C. Ribar, Why Marriage Matters for Child Wellbeing, 25 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 11, 11
(2015) (“Marriage between two parents, compared to other living arrangements. . .”) (emphasis added).
181
Id. (emphasis added).
182
Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2001) (“no-trespass” policy is rationally related to the
legitimate governmental interest in providing a safe housing to the tenants. . .”).
183
See Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 23 Fordham L. Rev. 23, 29
(2015).
184
Some critics have even voiced their concern that by exalting marriage, the Obergefell Court may have
weakened future claims of sexual and family liberty outside of marriage. See Gregg Strauss, What’s Wrong
with Obergefell, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 631, 641 (2018). Other scholars suggest the much-needed legal
reforms for non-marital families will be further delayed or curtailed if “Obergefell’s praise of marriage. . .
encourage[s] courts to interpret statutory terms like “family” or “kinship” to require marriage rather than
broadly to include non-marital families. Id. (referring to Melissa Murry, Obergefell v. Hodges and
Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1207, 1249, 1252 (2016)).
185
See generally Shelly Lundberg et al., Family Inequality: Diverging Patterns in Marriage, Cohabitation,
& Childbearing, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 79 (2016).

244

Vol. 15:2]

McKayla Stokes

especially true in public housing, where marital rates are likely substantially lower.186
This reality illustrates the limitations inherent in placing marriage at the core of the right
to family sanctity.
However, in the United States, expanding individual rights is often achieved
through an “incremental process.”187 So, while acknowledging Obergefell’s flaws we
must also recognize its flaws may be the very reason nonmarital families have greater
constitutional protection in the future.
Griswold and Eisenstadt illustrate this phenomenon well. In 1965, in Griswold, the
Court held that a Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally
intruded upon the “right of marital privacy.”188 Seven years later, in Eisenstadt, the Court
reasoned that a Massachusetts statute permitting married persons to obtain contraceptives
while prohibiting single persons to do the same violated the equal protection clause.189
Currently, Obergefell has the potential to be the Griswold that leads to the “new”
Eisenstadt.
My hope is that advocates recognize the power in potential, even where it manifests
in an unorthodox manner, and capitalize upon potential as the battle for the right to
family sanctity continues. After all, the tools are limited, and the stakes are high.
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